

TOP SECRET

53334
Copy no. 5

13 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR []

25X1

SUBJECT: Census and Verification of All Armed Forces and Armaments

In partial fulfillment of your request for a Special Estimate on the above subject, I transmit herewith the views of the National Estimates Board. These views were written in the light of contributions from the IAC agencies which are being made available to [], but the views are those of the Board and have not been coordinated with the IAC agencies.

1. The USSR may welcome a discussion of an agreement on census and verification of armed forces and armaments in the hope that:
 - a. Propaganda advantages might be won by denouncing the efforts of the US to secure a precise, unequivocal agreement as efforts to block any agreement on armaments.
 - b. Such a discussion might divide the US from its allies because of their eagerness to avoid the sacrifices necessitated by disarmament, and to find some basis for an accommodation with the USSR.
 - c. The US, to avoid dissension with its allies, might be induced to accept an agreement under which the USSR would gain more than the US.

2. Since the knowledge of Soviet armaments possessed by the US is fragmentary and in many cases shadowy, while the knowledge of US armaments possessed by the USSR is extensive and precise, from the point of view of acquiring intelligence information, the US would gain much more than the USSR from an agreement on census and verification which was honestly and fully carried out.

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT NO. 15
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 120481 REVIEWER: []

25X1

TOP SECRET

3. We believe that the USSR, if it should enter into an agreement on census and verification, would not carry out the agreement honestly and fully.

4. If it were possible to draft an agreement of census and verification which would protect the interests of the US, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would enter into any such agreement.

5. We believe that the USSR, in any event, would not enter into any agreement of census and verification unless it believed that the agreement provided it with the opportunity:

- a. of filling critical gaps in its information about the US before the US could fill critical gaps in its information about the USSR, and
- b. of breaking off the agreement when it had filled those critical gaps.

6. Under any agreement for census and verification there is grave danger that the USSR would find means to accomplish the purposes set forth in paragraph 5.

/s/

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

OAD/NE/SK:j1

Distribution:

Addressee

25X1

Central Records

DCI

AD/NE

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001300270010-2

Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001300270010-2

TOP SECRET

3. We believe that the USSR, if it should enter into an agreement on census and verification, would not carry out the agreement honestly and fully.

4. If it were possible to draft an agreement of census and verification which would protect the interests of the US, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would enter into any such agreement.

5. We believe that the USSR, in any event, would not enter into any agreement of census and verification unless it believed that the agreement provided it with the opportunity:

- a. of filling critical gaps in its information about the US before the US could fill critical gaps in its information about the USSR, and
- b. of breaking off the agreement when it had filled those critical gaps.

6. Under any agreement for census and verification there is grave danger that the USSR would find means to accomplish the purposes set forth in paragraph 5.

A/S/
WALTER B. SMITH
Director

OAD/NE/SK:j1
Distribution:
Addressee

25X1

Central Records
DCI
AD/NE

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE DCI		CIA CONTROL NO. 53334
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 13 April 1951
DOC. DATE 13 April 1951		LOGGED BY <div></div>
COPY NO. 5 and 6		
NUMBER OF PAGES 2		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None		

ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each top secret document received by the central intelligence agency or classified top secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant top secret control officer who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the top secret document and the date of handling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.

[illegible]

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from top secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to central top secret control for record.

THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:

DOWNGRADED ☐

DESTROYED ☐

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO

BY (Signature)

OFFICE

DATE _____

Dpt State